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Preliminary:  Please do not quote or cite without authors’ permission 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of child marriage using a new data set from rural India.  
Specifically, we focus on an extreme form of child marriage-- that is, the marriage of girls under the age 
of ten.  No other study to our knowledge has examined the factors influencing the likelihood of such early 
marriage. Our model estimates the relative importance of economic factors and social norms in 
determining the prevalence of child marriage.  Our findings reveal that the probability of a girl becoming 
married before her 10th birthday is highly correlated with the prevalence of child marriage within her own 
caste and village, even after controlling for household and village characteristics.  Surprisingly, economic 
variables--such as household income and relative poverty status-- do not significantly affect the likelihood 
of becoming a child bride.   
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1.  Introduction 
For millions of girls in the developing world, the onset of puberty marks the end of childhood and the 
beginning of adult responsibilities, including marriage and motherhood. Child marriage—that is, marriage 
before the age of 18—remains common in many traditional societies, even in countries where it is illegal. 
Rates of child marriage vary widely but are highest in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa where as many 
as half of girls in some countries are married before their 18th birthday. The marriage of children—
particularly girls under the age of 15 or 16—is widely viewed as a violation of basic human rights 
(UNICEF, 2001), (Jensen and Thornton, 2003).  The right to “free and full” consent when marrying is 
recognised in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as the 1979 Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women—but consent cannot be “free and full” 
when one of the intended partners is very immature.  In most cases of child marriage, the girl being 
married has no choice in either the timing of her marriage or whom she marries. 
 Early marriage is associated with a number of social and economic disadvantages for girls.  
Typically, child marriage coincides with the termination of formal schooling and can lead to social 
isolation when girls are cut off from family and friends.   Child marriage is often linked to premature 
pregnancy and childbearing.  Indeed, “pregnancy-related deaths are the leading cause of mortality for 15-
19 year old girls (married and unmarried) worldwide” (UNICEF, 2001).  Research shows that young 
brides are more vulnerable to both sexual and domestic violence (UNICEF, 2005).  Young brides tend to 
have less bargaining power within the household and may be viewed as the property of their husband.  
Divorce is rarely an option for these girls and those who do choose to run away from abusive marriages 
may be punished (or even killed) by their family.   
 While a great deal has been written on the adverse effects of child marriage, much less is known 
about why the practice persists in so many countries.  In this paper, we focus on the determinants of child 
marriage in an extreme form--that is, the marriage of girls under the age of 10.  Specifically, we 
investigate the relative importance of economic and social factors in determining the prevalence of child 





whether a girl becomes married before her 10th birthday.  We offer the hypothesis that parents feel the 
need to conform to social norms and, as a result, they adopt the behavior of other families in their caste 
who live in the same village.  
 To investigate the importance of social conformity on child marriage, we employ new data from a 
household survey designed by one of the authors and implemented in nine rural villages in western 
Rajasthan during 2004-5.  These data are unusual because they contain detailed information on the 
families of young girls who are eligible for marriage or already married.  To date, much of what is known 
about child marriage comes from household surveys—like the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS)—which collect information on the bride‟s current household (her husband‟s household) but not on 
the household and village where she was raised.  Such data are useful for understanding the consequences 
of child marriage but not for modeling the determinants of child marriage.  To do this, the researcher must 
have information on the girl's natal household as well as her parents' background because it her parents 
who typically decide the timing of her marriage.  Our data contain such information.  However, as girls 
ranging in age from 10 to 18 were interviewed and asked their marital status, we do not know the age of 
marriage for all girls in our sample.1  For example, some girls may marry after the interview but before 
they turn 18.  Therefore, we focus on the determinants of marriage before the age of 10.  No other study 
to our knowledge has examined the factors underlying such young marriages.  
 Our empirical analysis reveals that social norms play an important role in explaining the 
prevalence of child marriage.  Specifically, we find that the probability of a girl being married before her 
10th birthday is highly correlated with the prevalence of early marriage within her own caste and village—
whereas the cross-caste effects at the village level are insignificant.  Caste and parental education are also 
important, but economic status, including family income, relative income, and land ownership, are 
                                                          






surprisingly unimportant.  Several checks are carried out to verify our results, including a number of 
specifications which attempt to deal with the “reflection problem” identified by Manski (1993a).   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background material about 
the institution of marriage in India and relates this to the literature on social influence or conformity.  
Section 3 provides a brief explanation of the reduced form model that we estimate.  Section 4 describes 
the data and empirical results.  In Section 5, we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background  
India is an interesting country in which to examine child marriage for several reasons.  India has one of 
the highest rates of child marriage in the developing world. According to the latest National Family 
Health Survey (2005-6), 44.5 percent of women aged 20 to 24 were married before the age of 18 and, of 
these, 22.6 percent were married before the age of 16 (Rao et al, 2009).  Given the sheer size of India‟s 
population, this means that millions of girls are at risk of being married as children in the next decade if 
current trends continue.     
 Child marriage is illegal in India and has been illegal since The Child Marriage Restraint Act 
(CMRA) of 1929.  Updates to this law established the minimum age of marriage at 18 years for girls and 
21 years for boys. Under CMRA, child marriage is a crime which is punishable by either a fine or 
imprisonment of up to 3 months (Sagade, 2005).  In practice, the law is rarely enforced because there is 
no nationwide system for the registration of marriages which makes it difficult to prove that marriages 
have taken place below the legal age.  In addition, once a marriage is performed, it is legally valid even if 
the girl is underage.  Given the illegality of child marriage, the questioning of girls on their marital status 
is a highly sensitive subject which may lead to inaccurate responses in survey data. We are fairly 
confident, however, about the accuracy of our data since the enumerators for our survey live in the same 





even when they are performed in secret), the marital status of those within the village is usually common 
knowledge. 
 To better understand the nature of marriage markets in India, it is useful to outline the basic 
structure of Indian marriages.  Indian marriages usually take place within endogamous groups—that is, 
young people tend to marry only those who belong to the same caste. This preference for within-caste 
marriage is strong, even among middle-class Indians.2 Banerjee et al (2009), for example, measure the 
strength of discriminatory preferences using a new data set on individuals who placed matrimonial 
advertisements in a major Bengali paper. They find that “parents of a prospective bride would be willing 
to trade off the distance between no education and a master‟s degree to avoid marrying outside their 
caste”(p. 3). Similarly, Dugar et al (2008) reveal that “even a quadrupling of income is not enough to 
make up for a one-level caste difference between grooms” (p. 1).  
Several other features of the Indian marriage market are important. First, marriages are arranged 
by parents and, when parents‟ and children‟s preferences are discordant, parental preferences dominate. A 
recent survey from Rajasthan reveals that most girls preferred to be married at an older age than their 
parents believed would be optimal for them (Santhya et al, 2006).  It is the parents‟ primary duty to get 
their daughter(s) married, and having an older unmarried daughter means a loss of social status as well as 
additional monetary costs to the family.  Studies have shown the size of dowry payments to be positively 
correlated to the age of the bride, suggesting that it may be more expensive for parents to marry an older 
daughter (Chowdhury, 2010). Second, the Indian marriage market is patrilocal—that is, brides leave their 
parents‟ home to live with their husbands. In the villages surveyed, grooms are always selected from 
outside the bride‟s own village. Therefore, the proportion of child brides in a village does not imply 
anything about the supply of potential grooms.   
Surprisingly, rates of child marriage in India have not fallen significantly, despite the country's 
recent growth boom and falling rates of poverty.  According to Jensen and Thornton (2003), 57 per cent 
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of Indian women (aged 20 to 24) were married before their 18th birthday in 1975. Thirty years later, the 
rate of child marriage among the same age group of women had fallen by only 12.5 percent. The 
persistence of child marriage has puzzled policy makers since child marriage is usually thought to be 
associated with poverty. Indeed, the policy response by several regional governments has been to provide 
financial incentives to families who postpone their daughters‟ marriages.3 
One possible reason for the slow decline in child marriage is that many aspects of individual 
behaviour—including marriage and fertility— are tightly regulated by social custom. When strong social 
norms are present in a society, individuals may be slow to change their behaviour.  Indeed, many social 
customs—such as India‟s caste system—have persisted for generations despite the fact that a significant 
fraction of India‟s population would be better off if the custom disappeared.  As Akerlof (1976, 1980) 
noted decades ago, many social customs that are costly to follow persist because individuals are unwilling 
to suffer the loss of reputation which would result from breaking with custom. In this paper, we examine 
the importance of social norms in explaining the variation in rates of child marriage across villages in 
rural India.  
The term, 'social influence' has long been used in the sociological literature and more recently has 
become part of the economists‟ lexicon (Manski, 1993a), (Manski, 1993b), (Grinblatt et al, 2008), 
(Young, 2009).  We define 'social influence' as the proportion of girls in a village who belong to the 
family's caste and were married before the age of 10.4  This variable reflects the prevalence of child 
marriage at the village and caste level.  If a large proportion of a family's caste marry their daughters at a 
young age, we assume that the family will feel some pressure to adhere to the social norm of the village.  
Following Manski (1993b), we consider 'social influence' to be an endogenous effect in that individual 
families have a propensity to behave in a way that corresponds to the behavior of others in their reference 
                                                          
3 According to UNICEF (2001, p. 15), “the governments of Rajasthan, Karnataka and Haryana have established an 
incentive programme for low-income families.  In Haryana, for example, a small sum of money (Rs. 2,500 or 
approximately US$78) is set aside in a savings account for a girl at birth.  At the age of 18, if she is still unmarried, 
the girl is eligible to collect the accumulated sum of Rs. 25,000.”  
 
 





group. Behaviour with respect to age of marriage of daughters is endogenous in the sense that any policy 
intervention that directly affects attitudes about child marriage in one or more families in the group would 
have a “social multiplier” effect throughout the reference group (Manski, 1993b, p. 533).   
Our estimation strategy deals with the identification issue highlighted by Manski (1993a).  That 
is, the prevalence of child marriage in the reference group (i.e., caste) could be a proxy for any 
unobserved determinant of early marriage at the household level, at least to the extent that it is correlated 
among households in a village. That is, „social influence‟ could be picking up unobserved village effects.  
To address this potential problem, we employ an estimation strategy similar to that used by Munshi and 
Myaux (2006).  Specifically, we assume that parents respond to the marriage norms of families within 
their own caste and village but not to the marriage norms of other castes within their village.  For each 
household, we define the „other-caste‟ effect as the proportion of girls who are members of other castes in 
the village and were married as child brides (i.e., before the age of 10).  We expect this variable to be 
insignificant in all of our specifications.  If the 'other-caste' effect is significant, there could be unobserved 
household effects influencing our results.   
 
3.  The Decision to Marry  
To estimate the determinants of child marriage, we assume that parents decide the timing of their 
daughter's marriage.  By making this assumption, we introduce the classic agency problem-- that is, 
parents make decisions for their daughter(s) about when and whom to marry but they do not fully 
internalise the costs of those decisions.  For example, if parents choose to arrange the marriage of a pre-
adolescent girl without considering how such a marriage will affect her current or future well-being, they 
may select a lower age of marriage than would be chosen by the girl herself.   
 We assume that parental decisions are influenced by a number of factors which vary across both 
households and villages.  These factors include the standard socio-economic variables as well as a 'social 





village-specific norms which relate to the custom of child marriage.  We assume that parents feel pressure 
to conform to social norms but their willingness to conform varies across households.  For example, 
'social influence' is more likely to affect individuals when they have few information sources.  In such 
circumstances, parents are likely to watch their neighbours‟ behaviour for signals on optimal behavior.  
That is, parents observe the marriage decisions of same-caste families in their village and consider this 
information when making decisions about the timing of their own daughter's marriage.  We therefore 
predict that the probability of a girl becoming married before the age of 10 is positively correlated with 
the prevalence of child marriage among girls from the same caste in her village.    
 
4. Data Description and Empirical Results 
This study employs an original data set to investigate the role of both economic and social factors in 
determining the probability of child marriage.  The data were obtained from a stratified, random sample 
of approximately 1000 households surveyed in nine rural villages in the Jodhpur district of Rajasthan 
during 2004 and 2005.  The survey asked detailed questions about the status of adolescent daughters in 
the household, including questions on their age and marital status.  In addition, information was collected 
on their parents and siblings.  In households with more than one daughter, only one girl was interviewed.  
In most cases, this girl was the eldest daughter.5    
  Early marriage is common in rural Rajasthan.  More than one-third of the girls in our sample are 
classified as either 'effectively' or 'contractually‟ married.  Of those who are married, more than 70 
percent were married before the age of 10.  Girls are „effectively married‟ if they have had a wedding 
ceremony whereas they are „contractually married‟ if they are betrothed but have not yet had a wedding.  
It should be noted that marriage contracts, even among the very young, are considered irrevocable.  
Breaking a marriage contract can lead to a family‟s disgrace and may subject family members to violence. 
                                                          
5 If the family has daughters above the age of 18, they would not be interviewed. They would, however, be included 






We therefore categorize girls as married if they are either „contractually‟ or „effectively‟ married.  Many 
marriages are arranged during a girl's infancy or early childhood.  It is customary for pre-pubescent, 
married girls to remain with their families until they are old enough to move into their husband's 
household.6  The girls in our sample include single girls and married girls who live with their parents or 
married girls who maintain contact with their parents.   
As revealed in Table 1, most girls in our sample come from households with low levels of 
education and income. Only seven per cent of the girls‟ mothers, for example, are literate. This is lower 
than the national literacy rate for women in India which is estimated at 48 per cent (World Bank, 2008). 
The literacy gap for fathers is not as large. Fifty-six percent of the girls‟ fathers are literate while the 
national average for men is estimated at 73 per cent (World Bank, 2008). The average monthly income 
for households in our sample is 3,020 rupees which is equivalent to about two dollars per day at the time 
of the survey.  The rate of land-ownership, however, is very high (86% of households) and most families 
engage in some form of agricultural activities.  
In these villages, there are four main Hindu caste groupings: three lower castes and one high 
caste.  The three lower castes, scheduled castes (dalits), scheduled tribes, and other backward castes 
(OBC), are recipients of affirmative action by the Indian government.  The girls in our sample who are 
defined as OBC are predominantly and almost exclusively members of the Vishnoi caste.  High-caste 
(general caste) girls are virtually all members of the Rajput caste.  All households in the sample are either 
Hindu or Muslim, with Hindu being the dominant religious group (97% of the sample).  The Muslim 
families are quite assimilated into the community and were categorized as general caste by the 
interviewers.  To check that religion is not a confounding factor, empirical tests were conducted which 
                                                          






excluded the one village in which Muslim households were a dominant group.7  This exclusion entailed 
no significant changes to our empirical results. 
  To determine the factors which increase the likelihood of becoming a child bride, we estimate 
several different probits.  Covariates include caste, parental education, number of siblings, and household 
economic status. We define educational attainment in terms of literacy rather than years of schooling 
because many adults, particularly women, attain literacy through informal methods of schooling. In 
addition, we include the number of brothers and sisters as separate covariates because parental decisions 
about the timing of a daughter's marriage are likely to be affected by both the number and gender of 
siblings. We also include the girl‟s age (and its square) to capture any possible cohort effects.  
  Several variables are included which control for different aspects of economic status.  These 
include household income (measured by the head of household‟s monthly income), relative income 
(measured by a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the household‟s monthly income is below the 
mean income in the village), land-ownership (measured by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
if the family owns land), and electricity (measured by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
home has electricity).  
Table 2 presents the results of the probit analysis.  In column (1) we include only the 'social 
influence' and 'other-caste' effect as covariates. As predicted, the 'social influence' coefficient (marginal 
effect) is positive and significant but the 'other-caste' coefficient is not significant.  The positive 
coefficient of the social influence variable indicates that the probability of a girl becoming married before 
age 10 increases as the proportion of child brides from her own caste and village rises.  In column (2), we 
add covariates which control for income, parental education, number of brothers and sisters, land-
ownership, electricity, and the age and age squared of the girl.   The addition of these variables only 
slightly raises the explanatory power of the equation (the pseudo R2 increases from 0.09 to 0.12). 
                                                          
7 There was a concern that Muslim households are outliers in that there is no pre-adolescent marriage of daughters 






However, the magnitude and level of significance of the „social influence‟ effect remains virtually 
unchanged.  In this specification, the marginal effect of having a literate mother is highly significant and 
associated with a reduction of about 13 per cent in the probability of her daughter being married before 
age 10.  Perhaps most surprising, neither of the income variables are statistically significant.  
Only „electricity‟ and „owns land‟ are significant and the latter is only marginally significant. 
Having electricity in the home reduces the probability of a girl being a child bride by eight per cent 
whereas being in a land-owning family increases the probability by about the same amount. These two 
variables are likely to have social as well as economic dimensions. Land-ownership may be a proxy for 
higher social status which may facilitate earlier marriage if it is correlated with membership in a group 
with socially conservative attitudes. Having electricity may be associated with access to media sources 
(e.g., radio and TV) which provide information about attitudes outside the local village. Recently, Jensen 
and Oster (2009) have highlighted the importance of cable television in exposing rural households in 
India to new information. They find that the introduction of cable television is associated with a 
significant decrease in domestic violence toward women, as well as lower fertility and increased school 
enrollment.  
In column (3) we add caste fixed effects to the model.  Once we control for caste, the effect of 
„social influence‟ is still significant but the (marginal) coefficient is reduced from 0.72 to 0.43.  This is 
not surprising; it reflects the fact that social norms which operate via the caste system have an 
independent effect on child marriage.   The „social influence‟ effect is, however, still large enough to be 
of practical import.   For instance, if the proportion of child brides within her caste and village were to be 
cut in half, the probability of a girl becoming married before age 10 would decline by about 20 percent. 
Column (3) also reveals that high-caste girls are less likely to be child brides than girls who are members 
of OBC, which is the omitted category.  Girls in the other low castes are not significantly different from 
members of OBC in this respect. The addition of caste fixed effects also reduces the significance of 





         One cause for concern is that the lack of statistical significance of the income variables may be due 
to insufficient variation. In Table 3, we report average household income and its standard deviation by 
village which indicates substantial variation both across and within villages. Average monthly household 
income for the whole sample is about 3000 rupees with a standard deviation of about 1940 rupees. It is 
possible, of course, that the insignificance of the income variables is due to an ambiguous effect of 
income on age of marriage.  Higher income may reduce the age of marriage if households with higher 
incomes are better able to finance a dowry or wedding when their daughters are young. On the other hand, 
higher income may increase the age of marriage if the cost of maintaining at daughter at home is more 
easily borne by more affluent families.  
Another potential cause for concern is that 'social influence' may be correlated with income. To 
address this issue, we first estimate a model in which we omit all covariates except the income variables. 
We then add sequentially, family characteristics, caste fixed effects, and village fixed effects. In all 
specifications, the 'social influence' variable and the 'other-caste' variable are omitted. These results, 
reported in Table 4, show income to be insignificant in all specifications.  
  Finally, we examine whether the insignificance of the 'other-caste' variable arises because of 
insufficient variation of the caste variables at the village level.  Inspection of the data suggests that this is 
not the case. Table 5 shows the distribution of castes within each village, and it appears that no caste is 
dominant in any single village. A more formal test consists of partitioning the sample by caste and then 
re-estimating the model for each caste separately. Unfortunately, we are limited by the small sample size 
of two of the castes.8  Therefore, we estimate separate probits for girls belonging to the two largest castes 
which we refer to as „low caste‟ and „high caste‟.   The low-caste (OBC) sample comprises 42 percent of 
the girls whereas the high-caste (general-caste) sample comprises 26 percent.             
                                                          







  Some important differences emerge when we subdivide the sample into low- and high-caste 
households.  Referring back to Table 1, the rate of child marriage is much higher among low-caste girls 
than it is among high-caste girls. Thirty-seven per cent of girls in the low-caste sample were married 
before the age of 10 whereas the rate was only about six per cent for high-caste girls. Similarly, fewer 
low-caste mothers are literate. Only five per cent of low-caste mothers are literate compared with more 
than 15 per cent of high-caste mothers. However, the difference in economic status is less pronounced. 
Average monthly income of high-caste households is 3,431 rupees as compared to 3,208 for OBC 
households. Both groups have high rates of land-ownership, although electricity is more common in high-
caste households (68%) than it is in OBC households (56%).   
In Table 6, we present the results of the analysis on the partitioned sample.  The results from the 
„low-caste‟ sample are as expected. As seen in column (4), the 'social influence' effect is positive and 
significant while the 'other-caste' effect is insignificant. 'Electricity' has a significant negative effect as it 
does in the full sample. Less supportive results are found, however, when we estimate the probit equation 
using the „high-caste‟ sample. Results shown in column (5) indicate that neither the „social influence‟ nor 
the „other-caste‟ effects are significant for 'high-caste' girls. In addition, none of the variables which are 
significant in the other specifications are significant in this specification. A likely explanation for the lack 
of significance of the „social influence‟ variable is that it does not have the same effect among high caste 
families where the incidence of child marriage is low and therefore not the norm.  
To better understand how parental education affects the decision making process, we examine the 
sub-sample of girls with literate fathers. Ideally we would also like to examine the behaviour of families 
with literate mothers but the sample is too small. The results for the sample with literate fathers are 
presented in Table 7. The „social influence‟ effect remains significant, indicating that even families with 
literate fathers use informal information networks based on local norms when making marriage decisions. 
For this sub-sample, the effect of „literate mother‟ is negative, highly significant, and of greater 





is associated with about a 16 percent reduction in the probability of a girl being a child bride. This result 
suggests that mother‟s literacy plays an important role in reducing child marriage in households where the 
father is literate as well.  In addition, the effect of „high-caste‟ is again negative, highly significant and of 
approximately the same magnitude as having a literate mother. Unique to this sub-sample, the coefficients 
of both „age‟ and „age squared‟ are significant, with younger girls being less likely to be child brides. One 
possible explanation for this apparent cohort effect might be that literate parents have responded to the 
Indian government‟s campaign in recent years against child marriage by changing their behaviour.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the relative importance of economic and social factors in determining the 
probability of a girl in rural Rajasthan becoming a child bride.  Our empirical results reveal that social 
conformity plays an important role in explaining the prevalence of child marriage in this part of India.  
Surprisingly, the data reveal that economic variables--such as household income, relative poverty status, 
and land ownership-- do not significantly affect the probability of a girl becoming married before her 10th 
birthday. This result is unexpected since child marriage is usually viewed as a by-product of extreme 
poverty.  
 One interpretation of our findings is that parents interpret the behaviour of others in their social 
group as an informational signal when making marriage decisions for their own daughters. This 
interpretation is reinforced by our finding that having electricity in the home reduces the likelihood of 
child marriage in all but high-caste families and households with literate fathers.  This result suggests that 
providing access to information about social norms outside a family's own village may be an effective 
way of reducing child marriage in relatively isolated rural settings. 
One additional result we found is that mother‟s literacy lowers the probability of a girl becoming 
a child bride in families where the father is also literate. Future research is needed, however, to fully 





regarding child marriage. Our results suggest that some combination of educational programs and 
economic incentives aimed at whole villages may be a more effective public policy strategy than the 
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   Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Full and Partitioned Samples 





















Married < 10 years old 0.264 0.441 0.057 0.232 0.365 0.482 
 
Effectively Married 0.335 0.472 0.133 0.341 0.400 0.491 
 
Contractually Married 0.040 0.198 0.014 0.119 0.005 0.218 
 
Unmarried 0.625 0.484 0.857 0.351 0.546 0.498 
 
Father Literate 0.557 0.497 0.590 0.493 0.553 0.498 
 
Mother Literate 0.069 0.025 0.148 0.356 0.046 0.210 
 
Age of Girl 13.15 2.28 13.6 2.31 13.0 2.24 
 
Number of Brothers 2.19 1.12 2.15 1.17 2.11 1.06 
 
Number of Sisters 2.55 1.50 2.56 1.51 2.52 1.48 
 
Monthly HH Income1 3,020 1,942 3,431 2,290 3,208 1,851 
 
Owns Land 0.856 0.352 0.814 0.390 0.870 0.336 
 
Income < Village Mean 0.692 0.460 0.619 0.487 0.900 0.301 
 
Electricity 0.567 0.496 0.681 0.467 0.558 0.497 
 
Scheduled Caste  0.186 0.390 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
Scheduled Tribe 0.075 0.264 0 0 0 0 
 
Other Backward Castes  0.482 0.500 0 0 1 1 
 
High Caste 0.259 0.438 1 1 0 0 
 
Own-caste-own village 0.265 0.184 0.055 0.047 0.365 0.157 
 
Other-caste-own-village 0.244 0.123 0.319 0.135 0.200 0.081 































Other-caste effect      -0.056  (0.135)   -0.047  (0.136) 0.177  (0.430) 
 
Father literate     -0.175  (0.101) -0.050  (0.029) 
 
Mother literate   -0.507** 





No. of  Brothers      0.013              (0.014) 0.015  (0.014) 
 
No.  of   Sisters    -0.009  (0.011) -0.009  (0.010) 
 
Monthly income1     0.009   (0.012) 0.010  (0.012) 
 
Income < mean2      -0.025  (0.164) -0.008  (0.167) 
 
Owns land      0.287 
 
(0.161) 0.070  (0.041) 
 
Electricity   -0.300**    (0.109) -0.070*  (0.032) 
 
Age     0.114  (0.081) 0.117  (0.075)    
 
Age Squared        -0.00  (0.003) -0.004  (0.003) 
 
High caste     -0.208**  (0.043) 
 
Scheduled Caste         -0.045  (0.037) 
 
Scheduled Tribe         -0.042  (0.053) 
 
No. of 
observations  811  811  811 
 
Pseudo   0.089  0.117  0.135 
Note: The dependent variable is one = girl is married at age<10.  The social influence effect is the proportion of 
same-caste girls in own village (minus oneself) married at age<10.  The omitted caste is OBC.   1 Income  is monthly 
household income in 1000 rupees..    2Household income less than the village mean.  All probits include a constant. 








Avg. Monthly Household Income and Proportion of Land-Owning Households by Village 
Village # Avg. Monthly  
Income in Rupees 



























































































































Table 4: Alternative Specifications: Determinants of Child Marriage 











































































No. of Brothers 













No. of Sisters 












































































































































































Proportion of Child Brides and Caste Membership by Village 
Village # Sample 
Size 
% Married < 
age 10 





































































































































































































Social influence effect        0.792**   (0.170) -0.326  (0.246) 
 
Other-caste effect 0.234 
 
 (0.332) 0.069  (0.068) 
 
Father literate -0.060 
 
 (0.047) -0.013  (0.028) 
 
Mother literate -0.100 
 
 (0.099) -0.009 (0.035) 
 
Number of Brothers 0.035 
 
 (0.024) 0.019*  (0.009) 
 
Number of Sisters 0.009 
 




Income/month (1000 Rs) 0.007 
 
 (0.020) -0.001  (0.005) 
 
Income < village mean -0.018 
 
 (0.072) 0.014  (0.037) 
 
Owns land 0.124 
 
 (0.072) 0.050  (0.029) 
 
Electricity  -0.110* 
 
 (0.049) -0.017  (0.028) 
 
Age 0.098  (0.129) 0.294  (0.735)                                                                                                                  
 
Age Squared  -0.003  (0.005) -0.009  (0.025) 
 
No. of observations  389  210 
 
Pseudo   0.089  0.229 
Note: The dependent variable is one = girl was married at age < 10. The social influence effect is the proportion of 
same-caste girls in own village (minus oneself) married at age < 10. All probits include a constant. Robust standard 





























Mother literate -0.162**    (0.054) 
 
Number of Brothers 0.107 (0.068) 
 
Number of Sisters 0.004 (0.040) 
 
Income/month (1000 Rs) 0.015 (0.015) 
 
Income < village mean -0.032 (0.063) 
 
Owns land -0.002 (0.059) 
 
Electricity  -0.041 (0.042) 
 
Age 0.260* (0.107)  
 
Age Squared -0.009* (0.004) 
 
High caste -0.159* (0.059) 
 
Scheduled caste   -0.047 (0.047) 
 
Scheduled tribe  -0.059 (0.064) 
 
No. of observations  452 
 
Pseudo   0.112 
Note: The dependent variable is one = girl was married at age < 10.   The social influence effect is the proportion of 
same-caste girls in own village (minus oneself) married at age <10. The omitted caste is OBC.  All probits include a 
constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   Significance at 1% and 5% are indicated by ** and *, 
respectively. 
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